














However,	the	reality	of	 Irish	public	opinion	 is	more	nuanced:	support	 for	the	EU	 in	
Ireland	is	not	a	single	entity	but	a	complex	set	of	opinions	determined	by	a	variety	of	factors.	
Since	the	1990’s	knowledge	about	the	EU	amongst	the	Irish	public	is	low	with	individuals	in	
Ireland	more	 likely	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 economic	 aspects	 of	 the	 EU,	 such	 as	 the	 freedom	 of	
movement,	 the	 Euro	 and	 economic	 prosperity.	 This	 ‘knowledge	 deficit’	 is	 perhaps	
unsurprising	as	for	the	first	twenty	years	of	EU	membership	Ireland’s	self-perception	of	its	
status	within	 the	 EU	was	 that	 of	 a	 small	 peripheral	member	 state.	 Ireland	 became	 a	 net	
beneficiary	of	EU	funding	and	successive	Irish	governments	and	negotiators	prioritized	and	
maximized	 receipts	 of	 EU	 funding	 via	 the	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP)	 or	 European	
Regional	 Structural	 and	 Development	 Funds	 (ERSDF).	 Ireland	was	 often	 considered	 to	 be	
suffering	from	a	‘sponger	syndrome’	in	viewing	the	EU	as	a	source	of	additional	exchequer	
funding	for	a	poor	EU	member	state	with	Irish	politicians	and	officials	possessing	a	‘begging	
bowl’	 mentality.	 During	 the	 1990’s	 Irish	 government	 and	 Irish	 society	 were	 indeed	 pro-












of	 European	 integration	and	 the	 introduction	of	 the	Euro	met	 little	 resistance	and	 in	 fact	
produced	 sources	 of	 identity	 for	 many.	 However,	 individuals	 in	 Ireland	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	
national	or	intergovernmental	aspects	of	EU	membership	and	representation	rather	than	on	
the	 policy-making	 aspects	 of	 EU	 institutions	 which	 produce	 legislation	 that	 has	 an	 effect	
across	all	EU	member	states.	Therefore,	there	remains	a	proportion	of	the	population	who	
oppose	 further	 ‘sharing	of	 sovereignty’	and	are	concerned	about	 the	 impact	and	 Ireland’s	
involvement	in	the	EU	is	having	on	Irish	identity,	values	and	culture.	As	a	consequence,	the	
EU	project	in	Ireland	is	not	one	which	can	be	encapsulated	by	a	single	overarching	judgement	





Between	 1972-2012,	 Irish	 governments	 have	 held	 nine	 European	 referendum	
campaigns	with	two	broad	characteristics	emerging	from	each	campaign.	Firstly,	turnout	in	
EU-related	 referendums	 is	 generally	 lower	 than	 at	 Irish	 general	 elections	with	 the	 lowest	




Party	 as	 well	 as	 non-party	 political	 and	 civil	 society	 groups	 have	 all	 opposed	 EU-related	
referendums.	Up	until	 the	 first	 referendum	on	the	Treaty	of	Nice	 in	2001,	successive	 Irish	
governments	and	pro-European	campaigners	pointed	 to	 the	benefits	EU	membership	had	
brought	to	Ireland	in	terms	of	direct	financial	transfers	and	increased	opportunities	for	Irish	
workers	 and	 Irish	 industry.	 Pro-European	 groups	 and	 political	 parties	 in	 Ireland	 have	






The	rejection	of	 the	Nice	Treaty	 in	2001	and	Lisbon	Treaty	 in	2008	highlighted	 the	
potential	emergence	of	a	new	popular	scepticism	towards	the	EU	in	so	far	as	it	concerns	Irish	
interests	and	deeper	European	integration	in	Ireland.	The	emergence	of	referendums	as	key	
forums	 for	 debate	 about	 the	 EU	 in	 Ireland	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 much	 greater	 degree	 of	
polarisation	of	 opinions.	 This	 polarisation	 is	 two-fold.	 Firstly,	 referendums	 tend	 to	 reduce	
complex	issues	to	a	simple	‘Yes’	or	‘No’	answer.	Secondly,	with	nine	EU-related	being	held	
thus	 far	 in	 Ireland	 this	 mechanism	 of	 direct	 democracy	 has	 fuelled	 an	 element	 of	





politics	 and	 that	 voters	 often	 use	 referendums	 in	 order	 to	 express	 their	 discontent	 or	
satisfaction	with	the	incumbent	government	as	well	as	determining	their	vote	as	a	result	of	
party	 cues	 with	 people	 voting	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 political	 party	 affiliation.	 While	





Treaty	 in	 June	 2008	 both	 the	 domestic	 political	 and	 economic	 context	 played	 a	 vital	 role	
highlighting	elements	of	the	 ‘second	order’	and	‘issue	voting’	approaches.	 In	the	first	Nice	
Treaty	 referendum	 three	 key	 issues	 were	 at	 stake:	 sovereignty,	 neutrality	 and	 EU	
enlargement	emphasising	 ‘issue	voting’	by	 the	electorate1.	 In	 the	 first	 referendum	on	 the	
Lisbon	 Treaty	 ‘second-order’	 factors	 can	 be	 cast	 aside	 as	 satisfaction	 with	 the	 Irish	
government	declined	significantly	between	Lisbon	1	and	Lisbon	2.	The	change	in	the	political	
context	 from	the	first	Lisbon	Treaty	referendum	in	June	2008	to	the	second	Lisbon	Treaty	
referendum	 in	October	 2009	was	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Irish	Government’s	 attempts	 to	 address	
concerns	highlighted	by	 the	 ‘No’	 campaign	on	 issues	 in	 relation	 to	military	neutrality,	 the	
corporation	tax	rate,	the	belief	that	abortion	services	would	be	widely	available,	a	weakening	

















Brexit	 however	 represents	 the	 single	 greatest	 political	 and	 economic	 challenge	 to	
Ireland	since	World	War	Two.	Ireland’s	unique	circumstances,	including	the	issue	of	peace	in	
Northern	 Ireland	 and	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 Good	 Friday	 Agreement	 (GFA),	 must	 be	
addressed	in	Brexit	negotiations.	Firstly,	the	future	trade	relationship	between	the	EU	and	





















(DUP),	 a	 political	 party	 that	 defends	 the	 Union	 with	 the	 UK	 and	 provides	 the	 current	





The	 anticipation	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 Brexit	 on	 the	 Irish	 economy	 has	 learned	 itself	 to	
speculation	 about	 a	 potential	 Irexit.	 The	 question	 of	 Irexit	 has	 developed	 primarily	 as	 an	
economic	argument	implying	that	Ireland	will	be	left	marginalised,	peripheral	and	dependent	
post	Brexit.	This	economic	reasoning	centres	upon	two	issues.		Firstly,	Ireland’s	participation	
in	the	European	Single	Market	 is	vital	 to	the	economy	and	secondly,	 Ireland’s	 interactions	
with	 the	 British	 economy	 are	 heavily	 intertwined.	However,	 there	 are	 three	 fundamental	
economic	and	political	problems	with	the	Irexit	thesis.	Firstly,	from	an	economic	perspective,	








A	 poll	 conducted	 by	 the	 political	 polling	 company	 RED	C	 in	May	 2017	 found	 that	 88%	of	
individuals	 in	 Ireland	believe	that	 Ireland	should	remain	 in	the	EU,	notwithstanding	Brexit.	
This	trend	 is	reiterated	by	Eurobarometer	data	for	2017	with	83%	of	 individuals	 in	 Ireland	
believing	membership	of	the	EU	is	a	good	thing	(see	Figure	1).	Overall,	the	Irexit	debate	is	a	









While	 an	 Irexit	 is	 unlikely,	 Ireland’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 EU	 will	 not	 be	 without	
difficulties.	Firstly,	in	the	context	of	Brexit	on	issues	such	as	the	economic	impact	Ireland	will	
experience	as	well	as	questions	in	relation	to	the	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	





and	 instead	of	 turning	towards	an	historical	periphery	 Ireland	recognizes	that	present	day	
challenges	are	global	and	do	not	respect	borders.	As	a	consequence,	Ireland	is	best	placed	to	
meet	 these	 challenges	 through	 continued	 cooperation	 and	 engagement	 subsequently	
influencing	 solutions	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EU.	 Brexit	 means	 Brexit	 but	 for	 Ireland	 remaining	 a	
member	state	of	the	EU	is	in	its	national	interest	–	and	public	opinion	recognizes	this.	
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Table	1:	EU-Related	Referendums	in	Ireland	1973	–	2012	
EU-Related	Treaty		 Date,	Month,	Year		 Result	(incl.	turnout)	
Accession	to	the	European	
Community		
10th	May	1973	
	
Yes	83.09%,		
No	16.91%	
Turnout	70.88%	
	
Treaty	on	Single	European	
Act		
26th	May	1987	 Yes	69.92%	
No	30.08%	
Turnout	44.09%	
	
Treaty	of	European	Union	
(Maastricht)	
11th	June	1992	 Yes	69.05%	
No	30.95%	
Turnout	57.31%	
	
Treaty	of	Amsterdam		 22nd	May	1998	 Yes	61.74%	
No	38.26%	
Turnout	56.20%	
	
Nice	Treaty	1	 7th	June	2001	 Yes	46.13%	
No	53.87%	
Turnout	34.79%	
	
Nice	Treaty	2	 19th	October	2002	 Yes	62.89%	
No	37.11%	
Turnout	49.47%		
	
Lisbon	Treaty	1	 12th	June	2008	 Yes	46.60%	
No	53.40%	
Turnout	53.13%	
	
Lisbon	Treaty	2	 2nd	October	2009	 Yes	67.13%	
No	32.87%	
Turnout	59%	
	
Fiscal	Treaty		 31st	May	2012	 Yes	60.29%	
No	39.71%	
Turnout	50.60%	
Source:	Central	Statistics	Office	(CSO)	Ireland	
	
	
